{"id":4718,"date":"2021-07-02T01:35:28","date_gmt":"2021-07-02T01:35:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/digitalhumanrights.blog\/?p=4718"},"modified":"2021-07-08T07:29:56","modified_gmt":"2021-07-08T07:29:56","slug":"our-message-against-chatcontrol-in-the-eu","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/digitalhumanrights.blog\/en\/our-message-against-chatcontrol-in-the-eu\/","title":{"rendered":"Our message against chatcontrol in the EU"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\n[et_pb_section fb_built=&#8221;1&#8243; _builder_version=&#8221;4.9.7&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; custom_padding=&#8221;1px|||||&#8221;][et_pb_row _builder_version=&#8221;4.9.7&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; min_height=&#8221;3756.9px&#8221;][et_pb_column type=&#8221;4_4&#8243; _builder_version=&#8221;4.9.7&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221;][et_pb_text _builder_version=&#8221;4.9.7&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; hover_enabled=&#8221;0&#8243; sticky_enabled=&#8221;0&#8243;]<p><strong>The ePrivacy Derogation planned in the EU is an unprecedented attack on our electronic privacy of correspondence. And it is completely unsuitable for the supposed good purpose \u2013 combating child abuse.<\/strong><\/p>[\/et_pb_text][et_pb_text _builder_version=&#8221;4.9.7&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221;]<p><a href=\"https:\/\/digitalhumanrights.blog\/en\/press\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/digitalhumanrights.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/Press_material.png\" width=\"200\" height=\"200\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-4607 alignright size-medium\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Sometimes you have the impression of being a little crazy. You read about something and think \u2013 that just can\u2019t be true, the whole world would be upset about that. But it is true. And nobody seems to be upset.<\/p>\n<p>That is what happened to me when I learned about the ePrivacy Derogation, a massive attack on our electronic privacy of correspondence, right from the heart of our liberal democracy. The EU Commission has fast-tracked this <a href=\"https:\/\/secure.ipex.eu\/IPEXL-WEB\/dossier\/document\/COM20200568.do\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">legislative proposal<\/a> &#8211; and &#8230;<br \/><span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">..<\/span><\/p>\n<h3>&#8230; let\u2019s assume they meant well.<\/h3>\n<p><span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Let\u2019s assume that they believe that it is legal to search all chat messages, video chats and e-mails in servers all over Europe for child pornography and grooming without a cause and automatically. Billions of texts, images and livestreams a day.<\/p>\n<p>Let\u2019s assume they trust an AI to miraculously and cleanly distinguish between intimate photos among teenagers and assaultive pedophilia, between communications worthy of protection and criminal machinations.<\/p>\n<p>And let us assume that they are so firm in their belief in the good that they leave it to police forces and NGOs to collect sensitive material en masse, to sift through it and to store it securely without these volumes being abused or re-circulated.<\/p>\n<p>Assume further that they did not know that the bulk of the resulting accusations are false, often directed against young people, and can destroy entire exitences with ease.<\/p>\n<p>Let\u2019s assume ignorance of the mechanism by which domestic politicians greed for ever more surveillance \u2013 whether to simulate action, to save funds, to satisfy lobbyists, or to get closer to their ideal of perceived security. That there would be an honest belief that the once installed surveillance would not be extended to other fields in the next terrorist or drug crisis, or even then would never be misused to secure someone\u2019s power.<\/p>\n<p>Finally, let us assume that the EU Commission lives on a happy planet, without autocracies and dictatorships, in which the EU model is adopted only too willingly and with complete legitimacy.<\/p>\n<p>Even if one assumes all this, it is still completely incomprehensible how one can come up with such an idea.<\/p>\n<p>One could just as well open all letters, scan all trash cans and equip all apartments, cellars, allotments and forests with cameras and microphones in the hope of finding evidence of child abuse. How is it that the argument \u201cthis may help against child abuse\u201d is capable of short-circuiting the voting behavior of most EU parliamentarians? It should be obvious, I thought, what immense damage this is doing to our fundamental rights. To our democratic processes, to the attitude to life of every single person, if we knew that our entire communication was under general suspicion.<br \/><span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">.<\/span><br \/><span style=\"color: #ffffff;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<h3>Yes, indeed: child abuse is a terrible crime.<\/h3>\n<p><span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">.<\/span><br \/>It is an absolute imperative and a worthwhile effort to take effective action against this. But anyone who has studied the matter knows that this remedy is ineffective, even counterproductive. Criminals find other ways to exchange files. For <a href=\"microsoft%20an google search for child abuse\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">quite a while<\/a> now, Google and Microsoft have been scanning their data stores for child pornography. The number of cases in which pedosexual offenses were actually brought to conviction this way is vanishingly small \u2013 probably just in the double digits.<\/p>\n<p>But in the end, I was not alone in my extreme unease. I found enough like-minded people in European politics, among lawyers, in net-political circles and in my humanist Giordano Bruno Foundation who encouraged me to become active against this legislative initiative. So we, the gbs, have written a letter to all EU parliamentarians, which can be <a href=\"https:\/\/www.openpetition.eu\/petition\/online\/preserve-eprivacy-protect-childrens-rights-stop-chatcontrol\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">co-signed by everyone<\/a> as of today.<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_4591\" style=\"width: 235px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><a href=\"https:\/\/digitalhumanrights.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/MdEP_PatrickBreyer_1-scaled.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-4591\" src=\"https:\/\/digitalhumanrights.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/MdEP_PatrickBreyer_1-225x300.jpg\" width=\"225\" height=\"300\" alt=\"Patrick Breyer, MdEP von der Piratenpartei, beim Lesen seines Exemplars.\" class=\"wp-image-4591 size-medium\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-4591\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">\u00a0MEP Patrick Breyer (Pirates), reading his gbs mailing.<\/p><\/div>\n<p>And we made sure that they could experience our irritation: We opened the 705 letters and \u201cscanned\u201d them for suspicious content. An imposing seal with a seizure message identifies the &#8220;European Task Force Against Child Abuse&#8221; and its website <a href=\"https:\/\/etfca.eu\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">etfca.eu<\/a>. There you can find out with an arbitrary code what the case is about. In this way we hope to contribute to a rethinking.<\/p>\n<p>Perhaps not yet, until the vote, which is hastily scheduled to take place as early as July 6. It concerns an exception to the ban on searches \u2013 so this is still voluntary for providers and must be declared to users. But at least, when this practice becomes a mandatory rule, it must be clear to everyone among the parliamentarians that this is about the foundation of our freedom of expression and democracy.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong><em>Below is the letter we sent in English, French and German. We kindly ask you to co-sign it on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.openpetition.eu\/petition\/online\/preserve-eprivacy-protect-childrens-rights-stop-chatcontrol\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">OpenPetition.org<\/a>.<\/em><\/strong><span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">.<br \/>.<\/span><\/p>[\/et_pb_text][et_pb_text _builder_version=&#8221;4.9.7&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; background_color=&#8221;#deeded&#8221; custom_padding=&#8221;20px|20px|20px|20px|false|false&#8221;]<p><b>ePrivacy Derogation \u2013 children\u2019s rights vs EU fundamental rights?<\/b><\/p>\n<p>Dear Members of the European Parliament,<\/p>\n<p><b>Would you be comfortable with the thought that all your letters are being opened on the off chance that they might contain suspicious material?<\/b>\u00a0If not, please transfer this conviction to the digital sphere and vote against the abolishment of digital privacy for correspondence as part of the ePrivacy Derogation!<\/p>\n<p>The so-called \u201ce-Privacy Interim Regulation\u201d (2020\/0259(COD)) would require online messenger and email service providers to automatically scan private message content in real time for suspicious text and image content using error-prone artificial intelligence. All suspicious cases identified by AI would be automatically disclosed to investigative authorities in the EU \u2013 without the individuals concerned knowing about it. This is intended to counter the spread of child pornography on the internet.<\/p>\n<p>We, of course, share the sentiment behind the initiative:\u00a0<b>children\u2019s rights are a serious matter<\/b>\u00a0for which we as a foundation have been campaigning for years. But however well-intentioned it might be, this should not obscure the fatal impacts of the planned remedy:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><b>The digital privacy of correspondence would effectively be abolished.<\/b>\u00a0All communication content would be indiscriminately captured and searched on a massive scale. Self-censorship would immediately become the norm. Legal opinions have shown that such a mass and suspicion-independent screening of private communication content is not compatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.<\/li>\n<li><b>Baseless suspicions would become the rule.<\/b>\u00a0According to the Swiss Federal Office of Police (fedpol), the error rate for automatic message screening is around 86%! For example, harmless holiday snaps or intimate selfies made by young people would lead to private message content being automatically disclosed and the launch of police investigations. More than one third of criminal investigations are already directed against minors.<\/li>\n<li><b>Criminals are already finding ways to circumvent surveillance.<\/b>\u00a0When privacy is a crime, only criminals have privacy.<\/li>\n<li><b>A surveillance infrastructure would be created, which \u2013 as we know all too well from experience \u2013 would eventually be extended to other areas (\u201cmission creep\u201d).<\/b>\u00a0Sooner or later, under the pretext of fighting terror, crime or even the threat of losing power, governments would be tempted to use this tool in other ways.<\/li>\n<li><b>Experience has shown: Leaks, hacks, fails and abuse are inevitable.<\/b>\u00a0Collections of potential blackmail material would be created. In the past, cases have come to light where employees from investigative authorities and NGOs have themselves been secretly spreading child pornography. This would therefore often achieve the very opposite of what is wanted \u2013 the protection of children and fundamental rights.<\/li>\n<li><b>Most acts of violence against children happen in secret and are not documented electronically.<\/b>\u00a0Prevention is what\u2019s needed. A false \u201csense of security\u201d helps no one. Targeted and effective law enforcement methods should not be cut back, but expanded.<\/li>\n<li><b>Many victims of child abuse and leading providers are strongly opposed to universal search measures \u2013 as are 72% of EU citizens.\u00a0<\/b>Scanning all private messages is no substitute for solid police work and concrete help for victims of sexual violence. A representative survey in ten EU Member States has shown that 72% of respondents are clearly opposed to automated searches of private messages.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Please, don\u2019t get us wrong here:\u00a0<b>crimes against children are terrible and demand decisive action!<\/b>\u00a0But warrantless surveillance of our communications\u00a0<b>is totally inappropriate and creates a climate of mistrust<\/b>\u00a0in Europe.<\/p>\n<p>We therefore urge you to oppose the bill when it comes before Parliament on July 7 and 8!<\/p>\n<p>Kind regards,<\/p>\n<p><i>Dr. phil. Dr. h.c. Michael Schmidt-Salomon, <\/i>Spokesman of the Board of the gbs<\/p>\n<p><i>Peder Iblher, <\/i>gbs Rapporteur on digital basic rights<\/p>[\/et_pb_text][\/et_pb_column][\/et_pb_row][\/et_pb_section]\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The ePrivacy Derogation planned in the EU is an unprecedented attack on our electronic privacy of correspondence. And it is completely unsuitable for the supposed good purpose \u2013 combating child abuse. Sometimes you have the impression of being a little crazy. You read about something and think \u2013 that just can\u2019t be true, the whole [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4597,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"on","_et_pb_old_content":"[et_pb_section fb_built=\"1\" _builder_version=\"4.9.7\" _module_preset=\"default\" custom_padding=\"1px|||||\"][et_pb_row _builder_version=\"4.9.7\" _module_preset=\"default\" min_height=\"3756.9px\"][et_pb_column type=\"4_4\" _builder_version=\"4.9.7\" _module_preset=\"default\"][et_pb_text _builder_version=\"4.9.7\" _module_preset=\"default\" hover_enabled=\"0\" sticky_enabled=\"0\"]\n\n<strong>Die in der EU geplante ePrivacy-Ausnahme ist ein beispielloser Angriff auf unser elektronisches Briefgeheimnis. F\u00fcr den guten Zweck \u2013 die Bek\u00e4mpfung von Kindesmissbrauch \u2013 ist sie v\u00f6llig ungeeignet.<\/strong>\n\n[\/et_pb_text][et_pb_text _builder_version=\"4.9.7\" _module_preset=\"default\" hover_enabled=\"0\" sticky_enabled=\"0\"]<a href=\"https:\/\/digitalhumanrights.blog\/presse\"><img src=\"https:\/\/digitalhumanrights.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/Presseinfo-300x300.png\" width=\"200\" height=\"200\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-4607 alignright size-medium\"><\/a>Manchmal hat man das Gef\u00fchl, ein wenig verr\u00fcckt zu sein. Man liest von einer Sache und denkt \u2013 das kann nicht stimmen, dar\u00fcber w\u00fcrde sich doch alle Welt aufregen. Es stimmt aber. Und scheinbar niemand regt sich auf.\n\nSo erging es mir, als ich von der ePrivacy Derogation erfuhr, einem massiven Angriff auf unser elektronisches Briefgeheimnis, mitten aus dem Herzen unserer liberalen Demokratie. Die EU-Kommission hat diesen <a href=\"https:\/\/secure.ipex.eu\/IPEXL-WEB\/dossier\/document\/COM20200568.do\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Gesetzesvorschlag<\/a> im Eilverfahren auf den Weg gebracht \u2013 und ...\n<span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">.<\/span>\n<h3>... nehmen wir mal an, sie hat es gut gemeint.<\/h3>\n<span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">.<\/span>\nNehmen wir mal an, sie glaubt, dass es statthaft sei, s\u00e4mtliche Chatnachrichten, Videochats und E-Mails, die in ganz Europa \u00fcber die Server laufen, anlasslos und automatisch nach Kinderpornografie(1) und Grooming(2) zu durchsuchen. Milliarden Texte, Bilder und Livestreams am Tag.\n\nNehmen wir an, sie traut einer KI die Aufgabe zu, auf wundersame Weise sauber zwischen intimen Fotos unter Jugendlichen und \u00fcbergriffiger P\u00e4dophilie zu unterscheiden, zwischen sch\u00fctzenswerter Kommunikation und krimineller Machenschaft.\n\nUnd nehmen wir an, sie sei so fest im Glauben an das Gute im Menschen, dass sie Polizeien und NGOs \u00fcberl\u00e4sst, brisantes Material massenhaft zu sammeln, zu sichten und zu sicher zu speichern, ohne dass diese Konvolute ihrerseits missbraucht oder in Umlauf gebracht werden.\n\nNehmen wir weiter an, sie w\u00fcsste nicht, dass der Gro\u00dfteil der resultierenden Anschuldigungen falsch sind, sich oft gegen Jugendliche richten und mit Leichtigkeit ganze Exitenzen zerst\u00f6ren k\u00f6nnen.\n\nNehmen wir an, der Machanismus sei unbekannt, mit dem Innenpolitiker nach immer mehr \u00dcberwachung gieren \u2013 sei es, um Handeln zu simulieren, um Gelder einzusparen, um Lobbyisten zufrieden zu stellen oder ihrem Ideal einer gef\u00fchlten Sicherheit n\u00e4her zu kommen. Es best\u00fcnde der ehrliche Glaube, dass die installierte \u00dcberwachung nicht bei der n\u00e4chsten Terror- oder Drogenkrise auf weitere Felder ausgeweitet w\u00fcrde oder auch dann niemals zur eigenen Machtsicherung missbraucht w\u00fcrde.\n\nNehmen wir zuletzt an, die EU-Kommission lebe auf einem gl\u00fccklichen Planeten, ohne Autokratien und Diktaturen, in denen das Vorbild der EU nur allzugern und vollkommen legitimiert \u00fcbernommen werde.\n\nSelbst wenn man all dies voraussetzt, ist es immer noch v\u00f6llig unbegreiflich, wie man auf so eine Idee kommen kann.\n\nEbensogut k\u00f6nnte man alle Briefe \u00f6ffnen, alle M\u00fclleimer scannen und alle Wohnungen, Keller, Schreberg\u00e4rten und W\u00e4lder mit Kameras und Mikrophonen ausstatten, in der Hoffnung, Hinweise auf Kindesmissbrauch zu finden. Wie kommt es, dass das Argument \u201eDies hilft gegen Kindesmissbrauch\u201c dazu taugt, das Wahlverhalten der meisten EU-Parlamentarier kurzzuschlie\u00dfen? Es m\u00fcsste doch auffallen, dachte ich, welcher immense Schaden damit an unseren Grundrechten entsteht. An unseren demokratischen Prozessen, am Lebensgef\u00fchl jedes einzelnen Menschen, wenn wir w\u00fcssten, dass unsere gesamte Kommunikation unter Generalverdacht steht.\n<span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">.<\/span>\n<h3>Ja, Kindesmissbrauch ist ein furchtbares Verbrechen.<\/h3>\n<span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">.<\/span>\nEs ist ein absolutes Gebot und eine lohnende Anstrengung, wirksam dagegen vorzugehen. Aber wer sich mit der Materie befasst hat, wei\u00df, dass dieses Mittel untauglich ist, ja sogar kontraproduktiv. Kriminelle finden andere Wege, sich auszutauschen. Denn <a href=\"https:\/\/www.spiegel.de\/netzwelt\/netzpolitik\/kinderpornografie-microsoft-scannt-live-und-onedrive-a-984902.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">schon eine ganze Weile lang<\/a> scannen Google und Microsoft ihre Datenspeicher nach Kinderpornografie. Die Zahl der F\u00e4lle, in denen p\u00e4dosexuelle Straftaten tats\u00e4chlich auf diesem Wege zur Verurteilung gebracht wurden, ist verschwindend klein \u2013 vermutlich gerade mal zweistellig.\n\nDoch letztlich war ich mit meinem extremen Umbehagen nicht allein. In der europ\u00e4ischen Politik, unter Juristen, in netzpolitischen Fachkreisen und in meiner Humanistischen Giordano-Bruno-Stiftung fand ich genug Gleichgesinnte, die mich darin best\u00e4rkt haben, gegen diese Gesetzesinitiative aktiv zu werden. So haben wir in der gbs einen Brief an ale EU-Parlamentarier*innen aufgesetzt, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.openpetition.eu\/petition\/online\/eprivacy-erhalten-kinderrechte-schuetzen-stoppt-die-chatkontrolle\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">der ab heute von jedermann mit unterzeichnet werden kann<\/a>.\n\n[caption width=\"225\" id=\"attachment_4591\" align=\"alignright\"]<a href=\"https:\/\/digitalhumanrights.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/MdEP_PatrickBreyer_1-scaled.jpg\"><img src=\"https:\/\/digitalhumanrights.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/MdEP_PatrickBreyer_1-225x300.jpg\" width=\"225\" height=\"300\" alt=\"Patrick Breyer, MdEP von der Piratenpartei, beim Lesen seines Exemplars.\" class=\"wp-image-4591 size-medium\"><\/a> Patrick Breyer, MdEP von der Piratenpartei, beim Lesen seines Exemplars.[\/caption]\n\nUnd wir haben daf\u00fcr gesorgt, dass unsere Irritation f\u00fcr sie erfahrbar wird: Die 705 Briefe wurden von uns ge\u00f6ffnet und auf verd\u00e4chtige Inhalte hin \u201edurchsucht\u201c. Ein ehrfurchgebietendes Siegel mit einer Beschlagnahme-Nachricht wei\u00dft aus die \u201eEuropean Task Force Against Child Abuse\u201c und ihre Website <a href=\"https:\/\/etfca.eu\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">etfca.eu<\/a>. Dort kann man mit einem (beliebigen) Code erfahren, was es mit dem Fall auf sich hat. Wir hoffen damit, zu einem Umdenken beizutragen.\n\nVielleicht noch nicht bis zur Abstimmung, die eilig bereits am 6. Juli stattfinden soll. Sie betirfft eine Ausnahme vom Verbot der Durchsuchung \u2013 diese ist f\u00fcr die Provider also freiwillig und muss deklariert werden. Doc allersp\u00e4testens wenn diese Praxis zur verpflichtenden Regel wird, muss jeder und jedem unter den Parlematrier*innen klar sein, dass es hier um das Fundament unserer Meinungsfreiheit und Demokratie geht.\n\n<span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">.<\/span>\n\n<strong><em>Im folgenden ist der Brief wiedergegeben, den wir in englisch, franz\u00f6sisch und deutsch versendet haben. Wir bitten darum, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.openpetition.eu\/petition\/online\/eprivacy-erhalten-kinderrechte-schuetzen-stoppt-die-chatkontrolle\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">ihn auf OpenPetition.org<\/a> nachtr\u00e4glich zu unterzeichnen.\n<\/em><\/strong><span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">.<\/span>[\/et_pb_text][et_pb_text _builder_version=\"4.9.7\" _module_preset=\"default\" background_color=\"#deeded\" custom_padding=\"20px|20px|20px|20px|false|false\"]\n\n<span>Sehr geehrte<\/span>&nbsp;Mitglieder des Europ\u00e4ischen Parlaments,\n\n<strong>w\u00e4re Ihnen wohl bei dem Gedanken, dass all Ihre Briefe ge\u00f6ffnet werden, weil sie wom\u00f6glich verd\u00e4chtiges Material enthalten k\u00f6nnten?<\/strong> Wenn nicht, \u00fcbertragen Sie diese Erfahrung bitte auf den digitalen Bereich und stimmen Sie gegen die Aufhebung des digitalen Briefgeheimnisses im Zuge der <b><span>ePrivacy Derogation<\/span><\/b><strong>!<\/strong>\n\nDie sogenannte \u201eePrivacy-\u00dcbergangsverordnung\u201c (2020\/0259(COD)) w\u00fcrde Anbieter von online Messenger-&nbsp;und Email-Diensten verpflichten, private Nachrichteninhalte automatisiert und in Echtzeit auf verd\u00e4chtige Text- und Bildinhalte unter Einsatz von fehleranf\u00e4lliger K\u00fcnstlicher Intelligenz zu durchsuchen. S\u00e4mtliche von der KI identifizierten Verdachtsf\u00e4lle w\u00fcrden vollautomatisch an Ermittlungsbeh\u00f6rden in der EU weitergeleitet werden \u2013 ohne, dass die Betroffenen davon erfahren. Dies soll der Verbreitung von Kinderpornografie im Internet entgegenwirken.\n\nSelbstverst\u00e4ndlich teilen wir das Anliegen der Initiative: <strong>Kinderrechte sind eine ernste Sache<\/strong>, f\u00fcr die wir uns als Stiftung seit Jahren stark machen. Aber der gute Zweck darf den Blick<strong> auf die fatalen Wirkungen des geplanten Mittels <\/strong>nicht verdecken:\n<ul>\n \t<li><b><span> Das digitale Briefgeheimnis w\u00fcrde de facto abgeschafft.<\/span><\/b> S\u00e4mtliche Kommunikationsinhalte w\u00fcrden unterschiedslos und massenhaft erfasst und durchsucht werden. Eine Selbstzensur tr\u00e4te sofort in Kraft. Rechtsgutachten haben gezeigt, dass eine solche massenhafte und verdachtsunabh\u00e4ngige Durchleuchtung privater Kommunikationsinhalte nicht mit der Charta der Grundrechte der Europ\u00e4ischen Union vereinbar ist.\n<span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">.<\/span><\/li>\n \t<li><b><span> Falsche Verd\u00e4chtigungen w\u00e4ren die Regel. <\/span><\/b><b><span>Nach Angaben des Schweizer Bundesamtes f\u00fcr Polizei liegt die Fehlerquote der automatischen Nachrichtendurchleuchtung bei rund 86 %!<\/span><\/b> Harmlose Urlaubsfotos oder intime Selbstaufnahmen von Jugendlichen w\u00fcrden eine vollautomatische Weiterleitung privater Nachrichteninhalte und die Aufnahme eines Ermittlungsverfahrens durch die Polizei nach sich ziehen.\n<span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">.<\/span><\/li>\n \t<li><strong>Kriminelle finden schon heute Wege, die \u00dcberwachung zu umgehen.<\/strong> Wenn Privatsph\u00e4re kriminell ist, haben nur Kriminelle Privatsph\u00e4re.\n<span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">.<\/span><\/li>\n \t<li><b><span> Es w\u00fcrde eine \u00dcberwachungs-Infrastruktur geschaffen, die \u2013 aller Erfahrung nach \u2013 irgendwann auf weitere Bereiche ausgeweitet wird (\u201eMission Creep\u201c). <\/span><\/b>Fr\u00fcher oder sp\u00e4ter w\u00fcrden Regierende unter dem Eindruck von Terror, Verbrechen oder auch drohendem Machtverlust der Versuchung nicht widerstehen, dieses Mittel auch anderweitig zu nutzen.\n<span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">.<\/span><\/li>\n \t<li><b><span> Die Erfahrung zeigt: Leaks, Hacks, Fails und Missbrauch sind unvermeidlich<\/span><\/b><b><span>. Sammlungen mit potenziellem Erpressungsmaterial w\u00fcrden entstehen. In der Vergangenheit sind F\u00e4lle bekannt geworden, in denen Mitarbeitende der Ermittlungsbeh\u00f6rden und NGOs selbst die Weiterverbreitung von Kinderpornografie betrieben haben. <\/span><\/b>Oft w\u00fcrde so das Gegenteil dessen erreicht, was man will \u2013 den Schutz der Kinder und der Grundrechte.\n<span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">.<\/span><\/li>\n \t<li><b><span> Die meisten Gewalttaten gegen Kinder passieren im Verborgenen und werden nicht elektronisch dokumentiert. <\/span><\/b>Pr\u00e4vention w\u00e4re das Gebot der Stunde. Eine tr\u00fcgerische \u201eSicherheit\u201c hilft niemandem. Gezielte und wirksame Methoden der Strafverfolgung d\u00fcrfen nicht kaputtgespart, sondern m\u00fcssen ausgebaut werden.\n<span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">.<\/span><\/li>\n \t<li><b><span> Viele Betroffene von Kindesmissbrauch und f\u00fchrende Provider sind entschieden gegen die allgemeinen Durchsuchungs-Ma\u00dfnahmen \u2013 wie auch 72 % der EU-B\u00fcrger.<\/span><\/b> Das Scannen aller privaten Nachrichten ist kein Ersatz f\u00fcr solide Polizeiarbeit und konkrete Hilfen f\u00fcr die Opfer sexueller Gewalt. Eine repr\u00e4sentative Umfrage in zehn Mitgliedsstaaten der EU hat gezeigt, dass sich 72 % der Befragten deutlich gegen eine automatisierte Durchsuchung privater Nachrichten aussprechen.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\nBitte verstehen Sie uns richtig: <strong>Verbrechen gegen Kinder sind furchtbar und verlangen entschiedenes Handeln!<\/strong> Doch eine anlasslose \u00dcberwachung unserer Kommunikation ist <strong>v\u00f6llig ungeeignet und schafft ein Klima des Misstrauens<\/strong> in Europa. Wir bitten Sie daher nachdr\u00fccklich, sich bei der Abstimmung am 7. \/ 8. Juli gegen den Gesetzentwurf auszusprechen!\n\nMit freundlichen Gr\u00fc\u00dfen\n\n<em>Dr. phil. Dr. h.c. Michael Schmidt-Salomon<\/em>\nVorstandssprecher der gbs\n\n<em> Peder Iblher<\/em>\nReferent f\u00fcr digitale Grundrechte der gbs\n\n[\/et_pb_text][\/et_pb_column][\/et_pb_row][\/et_pb_section]","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[263,258,262,259,251,74,246,260,49,261,23,264],"class_list":["post-4718","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-blog","tag-chat","tag-chatcontrol","tag-email","tag-eprivacy-2","tag-eprivacy-derogation-en","tag-eu","tag-eu-commission","tag-priavcy","tag-privacy","tag-provacy-of-correspondence","tag-surveillance","tag-videochat"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Our message against chatcontrol in the EU<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The EU ePrivacy Derogation is an unprecedented attack on our privacy of correspondence. 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